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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the relationship between a country's Olympic 
performance and its overall economic condition, including population, economic 
resources, and political structures. A panel data set comprising the yearly data of 1996, 
2000, and 2004 are estimated by using a fixed-effect Tobit regression model. 
Following previous studies on this topic, population size and economic resources are 
measured by using population and per capita GDP. One major focus of this research is 
the influence of political structure on national Olympic perfonnance. Instead of using 
a socialist and non-socialist dummy variable like most previous studies, I used 
continuous variables, political freedom (PF) and civil liberty (CL), to estimate the 
impact of political structure. 
Consistent with previous studies on this topic, the regression results indicate that 
countries with a larger population and more abundant economic resources are more 
likely to perform better in the Olympic arena. Countries that are politically "Not Free" 
generally seem to perfonn better in the Olympics by winning more medals than the 
rest of the world. One interesting fmding is that the results suggest weakly that 
political freedom variables, both political freedom and civil liberty, display a 
V-shaped relationship with respect to medal shares. Being "Partly Free", has a 
negative effect on national Olympic performance as compared to countries that are 
"Free" and "Not Free". 
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I. Introduction 
The modern Olympics were conceived by their founder Pierre de Coubertin to be 
a competition between individual athletes, not countries (IOC, 2000). The Olympic 
Spirit emphasizes participation rather than winning. In reality, however, the success of 
a country's athletes is held to be an important source of national prestige. By-country 
medal tables are widely published. A glance at Olympic history will immediately tell 
us that not all nations have an equal ability to win medals. In this past August, 199 
countries participated in the Athens Olympics, and 124 countries did not win a single 
medal. On the other hand, the top ten winners collectively took home 514 medals, 
which is more than 50% of the medals available at the Athens Olympics. Therefore, a 
natural question to ask is why some countries are able to enjoy a great success in the 
Olympic arena, while some others are unable to do so. 
The unequal distribution of Olympic Medal numbers might be explained by the 
relative strength of countries in different sports. For example, with a large number of 
high-quality basketball players, the United States should have a higher probability of 
winning a medal in basketball. We could then generate a prediction for a national 
medal total by summing across sports. However, this paper takes a different 
perspective and attempts to predict a nation's Olympic performance by investigating 
the socioeconomic variables that have a significant influence on a nation's Olympic 
performance. The influence of population size, economic resources, political structure, 
and hosting advantage are estimated by using several different models. 
The paper is organized in the following structure. Section II introduces the 
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theoretical framework of the research and reviews previous literature related to this 
topic. The empirical model and data used to test the research hypothesis are described 
in detail in Section III. Section IV presents the regression results. Finally, Section V 
concludes the research by discussing avenues for future research. 
II. Theoretical Framework and Review of Literatures 
Starting with the post-World War II games, sociologists and economists began to 
analyze the impact of social and economic conditions on the number of Olympic 
medals won by different countries. Examples of those studies are Ball (1972), Grimes 
et a1. (1974) and Levine (1974). Those early studies showed that population, income 
per capita, hosting advantage, and political system have significant impacts on a 
nation's medal counts. First, population is one the fundamental determinants of 
Olympic success. A big population increases the group of potential athletes. As we can 
see, China wins more medals than most other nations, because having 1.3 billion 
people improves the odds of producing a Yao Ming. The second determinant is 
economic resources. Richer countries can usually afford to train athletes better, to 
provide better medical care, and to send a larger group of atWetes to the Olympic 
Games. Hosting advantage is also significant. The hosting country is allowed to 
participate in all events. In addition, the crowd of home spectators will support the 
performing athletes. The fourth determinant is political and economic structure. There 
is a large amount of evidence suggesting that communist countries perform better. 
This is probably because a central-planned economic system allows more 
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specialization in sports, and more resources can be distributed to training and 
supporting athletes than in market-based economies. Moreover, the governments of 
communist countries not only have a greater capability to channel economic resources 
to sports, but also have a stronger incentive to do so. Because Olympic performances 
are so closely connected with national prestige, winning a large number of Olympic 
medals can defInitely help them obtain recognition internationally as well as stimulate 
patriotism domestically. Without having a democratic political system, international 
recognition and patriotism are extremely valuable to the government for maintaining 
political stability. 
Surprisingly enough, the literature that models Olympic performance did not 
resume until the 1990's. An explanation of this might be that in the 1970's and 1980's 
the Olympic Games were disturbed by the Cold War. The fIrst study that restarts the 
performance analysis is Slughart et al (1993), which analyzes the Olympic 
performance of transitional economies. Recently, two studies by Johnson and Ali 
(2000) and Bernard and Busse (2000) revived attention on this issue. Johnson and Ali 
(2000) assume the medal counts to be a linear function of GDP per capita, population, 
and two dummy variables indicating hosting country and political system respectively. 
They fInd that the home advantage adds a 12 percent chance of success, and 
communist countries outperform the others by 12 medals (5 gold medals). 
Bernard and Busse (2000) estimate Tobit models for medal shares using data 
since 1960. They specify a Cobb-Douglas production function for national Olympic 
talent, using population and economic resources (measured in GDP) as production 
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factors. By specifying a Cobb-Douglas production function fonn, Bernard and Busse 
assume that both population share and economic resources should be subject to 
diminishing marginal returns. This assumption does make economic sense. Holding 
economic resources constant, additional talented athletes will inevitably decrease the 
funds available to each person, and some athletes might not be able to obtain the 
training conditions that are necessary for them to fully reach their potential. Therefore, 
the marginal contribution of population share to the Olympic medal winning process 
tends to decline as the population size gets bigger. Conversely, holding population 
constant, additional economic resources allocated to sports should also yield 
diminishing returns as more athletes attain their potential. As we move down the list 
of athletes, we encounter less-talented athletes. Spending economic resources in 
training those average athletes will not produce any Olympic medals. In an extreme 
case, once all the talented athletes who are capable of competing for Olympic medals 
in a country reach their physical limits by having ideal training conditions, additional 
funding would not increase the country's Olympic medal share at all. In addition, 
Bernard and Busse also include a dummy variable for the hosting advantage, a soviet 
dummy, and a non-soviet but planned economy dummy. The hosting advantage is 
estimated to be 1.2 percentage point medal share. The effect of the soviet dummy 
varies between 3-6 percentage points. 
Some of the most recent studies go beyond medal counts and argue that not all 
Olympic medals are alike, and countries with different characteristics specialize in 
different sports. Tcha and Pershin (2003) investigate each country's performance and 
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attempt to identify the detenninants of this perfonnance in each sport, and also 
examine other issues related to specialization at these games, using the concept of 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA). Each country's RCA is explained by 
geographical, biological, and economic variables of the participating countries. The 
analyses present the detenninants of each country's specialization in sports and the 
patterns of RCA, which are substantially different from those obtained by analyzing 
the medal total. The authors found that high-income countries specialize less; in other 
words, they win medals in a more diversified range of sports. 
This paper will follow the most recent studies on modeling national Olympic 
perfonnance and will investigate the relationship between a country's Olympic 
perfonnance and its overall socioeconomic condition, including population, economic 
resources, and political structures. A panel data set comprising the yearly data of 1996, 
2000, and 2004 are estimated by using the fixed-effect Tobit regression model. The 
reason for using the Tobit model is that the majority of participating countries usually 
do not win any medals, and this fact causes the existence of a large number of zero 
values in my data. 
A different approach from prevlOus studies is that instead of using a single 
dummy variable (socialist or non-socialist), two continuous variables, (political 
freedom and civil liberty), are used in this research. There are three reasons for this 
change. First, although most socialist countries are not politically free, the incentives 
for using good Olympic perfonnance to stimulate nationalism are not limited to 
socialist countries. Many other capitalist countries with relatively low levels of 
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political freedom can also take advantage of this effect. Second, using continuous 
variables not only distinguishes countries that are extremely not free from others, but 
also reveals the impact of political freedom on countries with moderate levels of 
political freedom. Third, the level of political freedom varies over time. A nation's 
rating might change drastically during a four-year period. Hence, continuous variables 
will function better than a dummy variable in capturing the impact of the changes on 
political freedom variables. Based on the results of previous studies, I expect 
population size and economic resources to be positively correlated with a country's 
medal share, and being a country with a low level of political freedom or being a 
hosting country increases a country's medal share. 
III. Empirical Model and Data 
In this paper, I follow the empirical model constructed by Bernard and Busse 
(2000), which uses a Cobb-Douglas production function for producing Olympic 
talents. It assumes that producing Olympic talent (T) is intrinsically similar to the 
process of producing other goods and services, and the two key inputs are population 
size (N) and economic resources (Y), which are both subject to diminishing marginal 
return. Hence, the medal winning process can be modeled in the following way: 
(1) 
where T is Olympic talent, N is population, Y is GDP, and A is organizational ability of a 
particular country. The subscript i denotes a particular country, and the subscript t denotes a 
particular year. For example T iJ represents the aggregate quantity of Olympic talent of 
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country i in year t. Obviously, we also have to assume that year t is one of the years in which 
the Olympics were held. Medal share (Mit) is calculated by dividing the medal count of 
country i at year t by the total number of medals available in that year. We assume that Mit 
is a function of the Olympic talent within that country in that year; that is, Mil = g(Tit). 
Guided by the research by Bernard and Busse (200 1), I use a log function for the translation 
from relative Olympic talent to medal shares: 
Mil = In(Tit / LjTjt ) (2) 
Equation (2) assumes the medal share (Mil) equals the natural log of the Olympic talent 
share (Til / LjTjt), which is a fraction of the Olympic talent of country i over the sum of 
Olympic talents ofall participating countries at the year t. In Bernard and Busse's research, 
both the linear (without the natural log) and the logarithmic functional are been tried in 
order to find a better fit. It turns out that the logarithmic functional fonn does a much better 
job than the linear one. 
By substituting Til in equation (2) with N] Yile Ail, we obtain the following 
specification for medal shares: 
(3)
 
Because national income can be rewritten as the product ofpopulation and per capita GDP, 
I will actually estimate the following equation: 
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where ~l equals (y+B), and f3z equals 8. Because, Ail is organizational ability of country i in 
year t, it is a function of all other variables except Nil and (Y1N)i/. In this paper, since I am 
interested explicitly in the impacts of hosting advantage and political structure on national 
Olympic perfonnance, Ai' can be represented by Hosti/, PSVil, and sets of dummy variables 
for country (d j) and year (VI) to capture other differences among countries and years. Notice 
that I:j Tjl is no longer in the equation, because I:j Tjl is the same for all participating countries 
in a particular year, and its impact will be captured by the year dummy variables (v,). 
Finally eilis the statistical error tenn. 
Data used for this research are from three sources. Yearly data of Olympic medal 
counts and infonnation on hosting countries are obtained by direct correspondence with the 
International Olympic Committee (IOE). I do not distinguish between gold, silver, and 
bronze medals, because the difference between the best and the second best is usually so 
tiny that the rank of medalists depends more on luck rather than sport talents. The data on 
population (measured in million people) and per capita GDP (measured in PPP 2004 
international dollars) are extracted from the World Development Report (World Bank, 
2004). 
The political structure variables are extracted from Freedom House, a 
non-governmental, non-profit organization founded sixty years ago. Every year, 
Freedom House publishes "Freedom in the World," an annual report of the political 
rights and civil liberties in countries and territories around the world. In this report, 
each country is evaluated based on a checklist of questions evaluating political rights 
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and civil liberties. According to Freedom House's definitions, 
Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process,
 
including the right to vote, compete for public office, and elect
 
representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are
 
accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of
 
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law,
 




Based on the survey results, each country is given ratings for political rights and civil 
liberties respectively based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest degree of 
freedom present and 7 the lowest. The average of each country's political rights and civil 
Table 1: Definitions ofKey Variables and HypothesiZed$.gd~ 
Dependent Variable: Definitions: Hypothesized Sign 
Medal Share (M) 
The number of medals won by a country as the share of 
total medals available at a particular Olympic Game 
n/a 
Independent Variables: 
Population (N) The population 
people) 
size of a country (measured in million 
+ 
GOP per capita (YIN) The per capita GOP of a country (measured in PPP 2004 
international dollars) + 
Political Rights (PR) the rating of political rights (from 1 to 7) + 
Political 
Structures 
Civil Liberties (CL) the rating of civil liberties (from I to 7) + 
(PSV) 
Overall Status (OS) 
A set of 3 dummy variables (0 and I) representing "Not 
Free", "Partly Free", and "Not Free" respectively 
n/a 
Hosting Country (Host) 
1 if the country is the hosting country of the 
ootherwise 
+ 
liberties ratings are used to determine the country's "overall status" of political 
freedom. "Those whose ratings average 1.0-2.5 are considered Free, 3.0-5.0 Partly 
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Free, and 5.5-7.0 Not Free. (Freedom House) In this paper, the rating of political 
rights (PR), the rating of civil liberties (CL), and the overall status (OS) are used 
separately in equation (4) as PSV to fmd the best fit. I do not put more than one PSV 
variable into the equation because of multicollinearity between these three variables. 
Table 1 gives the defmition of each variable used. 
I use data from the last three Olympics (1996, 2000, and 2004). I do not include 
Olympics before 1996 because Olympic performances in many of those games were 
twisted by non-socioeconomic factors. For example, due to the Cold War, the United 
States did not attend the Moscow Olympics in 1980. Also along with many other 
socialist countries, the Soviet Union boycotted the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984. 
Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 also significantly distorted the 
performance of former Soviet countries. 
It is reasonable to assume that a period of time is necessary for the impact of 
population, economic resource, and other socioeconomic variables to be fully realized, 
because training first-rate atWetes takes time. Data with a lag of 2 years and 3 years 
are used to reflect this "time-to-build" effect. Descriptive statistics of the data used for 
this research are provided in Table 2. 
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Table 2:_Des~riptive Statisties of Key Variab les 0, . 0 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Medal Shares (M) M, 600 0.5029167 1.401269 0 12.04 
Population (N) N'_l 570 30,765 118,032 17 1,280,400 
N'-3 569 30,415 116,714 16 1,271,850 
GOP per capita (YIN) (YIN)'_2 483 246,206 856,826 317 10,300,000 
(YIN)t-3 487 234,130 811,872 300 
1 
9,912,139 
Political Rights (PL) PRt-2 555 3.466667 2.193745 7 
PR;-3 554 3.519856 2.226051 1 7 
Civil Liberties (CL) CLt-2 555 3.594595 1.837134 1 7 
CI.-1-3 554 3.680505 1.844031 1 7 
Overall Status (OS) Descriptive statistics omitted, because OS are dummy variables. 
Descriptive statistics omitted, because Host is a dummy variable. Hosting Country (Host) 
Note: the subscripts denote the lag. For example Nt-2 denotes population with a lag of two years 
IV. Results 
Fixed-effect Tobit regressions are applied to estimate equation 4, and the rating of 
political rights CPR), the rating of civil liberty, and the overall status have been 
plugged into the equation as political freedom variables. The regression results for the 
models with a lag of three years are shown in Table 3, and the regression results for 
the models with a lag of two years, which are essentially the same, are shown in 
Appendix 1. As we can see from Table 3, population, per capita GDP, and hosting 
advantage show highly significant, positive influences on national Olympic 
performance. Moreover, the coefficients of these three variables are very stable across 
different model. These results are consistent with previous research. 
Also, as previous studies have revealed, countries that are politically "Not Free" 
may perform somewhat better in the Olympics by winning more medals than the rest 
of the world, though the difference between "Free" and "Not Free" is not significant. 
However, an interesting fmding is that the overall status displays a V-shaped 
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relationship with respect to medal shares. Being "Partly Free", has a negative effect 
on national Olympic performance when compared to countries that are "Free" and 
"Not Free". As we can see, the coefficient of "Partly Free" is negative and reasonably 
significant. To further test this relationship, I replace the "Not Free", "Partly Free" 
dummies with political rights (model 2) and civil liberties (model 3). In each case, the 
addition of the square seems to improve the fit slightly, with the signs - positive for 
the variable and negative for its square - suggesting a V-shaped curve. 
[f~;.r-.'.\" 'r;' ,~~~'. :~-~7~,''-T.r···~··k'J~~·''\~''''')·1-;':'''- ~,:> " -:"- ::.... ,;.;,~~::-\y~..--.... ;- '.. 1. ~ \" ..,:..-;, ~~ ~:_I~~~~_j:o. \~'~.~l-~ ... ~~~J,:~ :~::~~~~.: ~~~~:~1~(~~--;_~""OO':!\A:~~~_.-  ~~"'! ~ 
Variables Modell Model2-a Model2-b Mode13-a Model3-b 
In(Population) 0.4343 0.4244 0.4211 0.425 0.4249 
(12.54)*** (11.52)*** (11.42)*** (11.54)*** (11.54)*** 
In(Per capita GDP) 0.4308 0.3906 0.3895 0.3932 0.3932 
(7.63)*** (6.41)*** (6.40)*** (6.44)*** (6.44)*** 
Hosting (dummy) 2.1542 2.5753 2.5663 2.5623 2.5553 
(5.07)*** (5.25)*** (5.24)*** (5.22)*** (5.20)*** 
Not Free (dummy) 0.022 
(0.19) 
Partly Free (dummy) -0.1841 
(-1.70)** 
Political Rights 0.0143 -0.1298 
(0.66) (-1.l7)* 
(Political Rightsi 0.0185 
(1.33)* 
Civil Liberty 0.0235 -0.0143 
(0.92)* (-0.12) 
(Civil Liberty)2 0.0049 
(0.33) 
Log Likelihood -564.6722 -519.7435 -518.8667 -519.5382 -519.4826 
Note: Z-values are in the parenthesis. ***Significant at 0.05 level, **Significant at 0.1 level, *Significant at 0.5 level. 
Again, some of the coefficients or PSVs are not strictly significant. Still, it is quite 
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striking to see the consistency across different models. The results consistently 
suggest a V-shaped relationship between PFV and Olympic performance. 
One possible explanation of this V-shaped relationship might be that, for nations 
that have a high to medium level of political freedom, its citizens usually have a pretty 
high level of satisfaction with their political rights and civil liberty. Being already 
quite proud of their homeland, the effect of a good Olympic performance in 
stimulating nationalism becomes almost irrelevant. However, for nations which have a 
less free political structure, a good Olympic performance functions almost like 
steroids, which could tremendously enhance national prestige and enable its citizens 
to feel extremely proud of their home country in the short-run. 
To test the accuracy of my model, I calculate the predicted medal winning of each 
country at the Athens Olympics. The predicted medal counts and the actual numbers 
are listed in Appendix 2 for comparison. The predicted values are computed based on 
Model 1 with a lag of 3 years. I used the Overall Status (OS) as my PFV simply 
because it yields better results than the others. For the most part, the model does a 
reasonably good job on predicting national Olympic performance. One measure is the 
standard error of the forecast. 
Lil(Xi~ _X[)2 =3.2018Sr= 
n-k 
This means the predicted values are on average off by 3.20 medals from the actual 
values. 
In fact, the model does a better job than this measure suggests. The inaccuracy is 
largely due to the existence of outliers, e.g. Cuba and Russia, for which the predicted 
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values are off by more than 20 medals. Generally, fonner Soviet countries and 
socialist countries are systematically under-predicted. This shortcoming probably has 
to do with my choice of using the political freedom index, which captures the 
incentive for a nation to use a good Olympic perfonnance to stimulate patriotism and 
enhance domestic political stability. However, this is only one side of the story. By 
having a powerful national government, which governs the central-planned economy, 
fonner Soviet countries and many other socialist countries may be more capable in 
channeling funds to support sports than other nations with a low political freedom 
index but a relatively weak government. In other words, although countries that are 
politically not free have incentives to boost their Olympic perfonnance, not all of their 
national governments have the same ability to achieve the goal like the powerful 
governments of many socialist countries do. 
In addition, many fonner Soviet countries have undergone a significant change of 
political structure. Many of them, e.g. Russia and Ukraine, have shifted from "Not 
Free" to "Partly Free." However, the infrastructures and facilities established during 
the Soviet period still exist and continue to bring medals to those countries. In fact, 
many excellent atWetes, trained during the Soviet period, are still competing in the 
Olympic arena for their home countries, and that also contributes to the higher 
number of Olympic medals won by fonner Soviet countries than my model's 
prediction. 
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V. Conclusion 
Consistent with previous studies on national Olympic performance, this paper 
finds that socioeconomic variables, including population, economic resources, and 
hosting advantage, have significant impact on a country's Olympic performance. In 
general, population and economic resources (per capita GDP) are positively 
correlated with medal counts. The larger the population size, the more likely a 
country is to do better in Olympics; the richer a country is, the more Olympic medals 
it will likely win. Being a hosting nation also has a favorable influence on a country's 
Olympic performance. In general, my results are consistent with those of the studies 
carried out by Johnson and Ali (2000) and Bernard and Busse (2000). Most influential 
factors identified by those previous studies are verified to be statistically significant. 
One interesting fmding of my research is that the regression results, though somewhat 
weakly, suggest that political freedom variables, both political freedom and civil 
liberty, display a V-shaped relationship with respect to medal shares. Being "Partly 
Free", has a negative effect on national Olympic performance when compared to 
countries that are "Free" and "Not Free". Avenues for future research include 
verifying this V-shaped relationship, and testing possible explanations. 
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Appendix 1: 
~~ 
Variables Modell Model2-a Model2-b Model3-a Model3-b 
In(Population) 0.4590 0.4261 0.4227 0.4261 0.4255 
(13.77)*** (11.5)*** (11.39)*** (11.51)*** (11.49)*** 
In(Per capita GOP) 0.4737 0.4016 0.4001 0.4035 0.4028 
(6.14)*** (6.5)*** (6.48)*** (6.53)*** (6.52)*** 
Hosting (dummy) 2.4095 2.5599 2.5388 2.5472 2.5340 
(3.46)*** (5.2)*** (5.16)*** (5.18)*** (5.15)*** 
Not Free (dummy) 0.2137 
(0.98)* 
Partly Free (dummy) -0.3022 
(-1.4)* 
Political Rights 0.0142 -0.1161 
(0.66) (-1.02)* 
(Political Rights)2 0.0167 
(1.16)* 
Civil Liberty 0.0243 -0.0496 
(0.96)* (-0.43) 
(Civil Liberty)2 0.0095 
(0.66) 
Log Likelihood -584.7872 -517.2418 -516.5644 -516.9995 -516.7816 
Note: Z-values are in the parenthesis. ***Significant at 0.05 level, **Significant at 0.1 level, *Significant at 0.5 level. 
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Appendix 1: 
Free Not FreePardyFrte 
Countries Actual Predicted Countries Actual Predicted Countries Actual Predicted 
American Samoa 0 o Albania 0 o Afghanistan 0 0 
Andorra 0 o Antigua and Barbuda 0 o Algeria 0 0 
Argentina 6 o Annenia 0 oAngola 0 0 
Aruba 0 o Bahrain 0 oAzerbaijan 5 0 
Australia 49 50 Bangladesh 0 o Belarus 15 20 
Austria 7 14 Bolivia 0 oBhutan 0 0 
Barbados 0 o Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 oBrunei 0 0 
Belgium 3 o Burkina Faso 0 oCambodia 0 0 
Belize 0 oBunmdi 0 oCameroon I 0 
Benin 0 oColombia I oCayman Islands 0 0 
Bermuda 0 oComoros 0 oCentral African Republic 0 0 
Botswana 0 oCongo, Democratic Republic of the 0 oChad 0 0 
Brazil 10 13 Djibouti 0 oChina 63 64 
British Virgin Islands 0 oEcuador 0 oCongo, Republic of the 0 0 
Bulgaria 12 16 Ethiopia 7 I J Cote d'ivoire 0 0 
Canada 12 18 Fiji 0 oCuba 27 0 
Cape Verde 0 oGabon 0 oEgypt 5 0 
Chile 3 oGeorgia 4 o Equatorial Guinea 0 0 
Cook Islands 0 oGuatemala 0 oEritrea I 0 
Costa Rica 0 oGuinea-Bissau 0 oGuam 0 0 
Croatia 5 o Honduras 0 oGuinea 0 0 
Cyprus 0 o Indonesia 4 oHaiti 0 0 
Czech Republic 8 12 Jordan 0 o Iran 6 0 
Denmark 8 10 Kenya 7 12 Iraq 0 0 
Dominica 0 o Kuwait 0 oKazakhstan 8 0 
Dominican Republic I oMacedonia 0 oKorea, North 5 0 
EI Salvador 0 o Madagascar 0 oKyrgyLStan 0 0 
Estonia 3 o Malawi 0 oLaos 0 0 
Finland 2 o Malaysia 0 oLebanon 0 0 
France 33 38 Moldova 0 oLiberia 0 0 
Germany 48 60 Morocco 3 o Libya 0 0 
Ghana 0 o Mozambique 0 oMaldives 0 0 
Greece 16 27 Nepal 0 oMauritania 0 0 
Grenada 0 oNicaragua 0 oNetherlands Antilles 0 0 
Guyana 0 o Niger 0 17 Oman 0 0 
Hong Kong I oNigeria 2 oPakistan 0 0 
Hungary 18 22 Papua New Guinea 0 oPalestine 0 0 
Iceland 0 oParaguay I oQatar 0 0 
India I o Russia 91 69 Rwanda 0 0 
Ireland I oSeychelles 0 oSaudi Arabia 0 26 
Israel 2 oSierra Leone 0 oSomalia 0 0 
Italy 33 33 Singapore 0 oSudan 0 0 
Jamaica 5 oSolomon Islands 0 oSwaziland 0 0 
Japan 37 26 Sri Lanka 0 oSyria I 0 
Korea, South 30 30 Tanzania 0 oTajikistan 0 0 
Latvia 4 oThe Gambia 0 oTogo 0 0 
Lesotho 0 oTonga 0 oTunisia 0 0 
Liechtenstein 0 oTrinidad and Tobago I oTurkmenistan 0 0 
Lithuania 3 oTurkey 10 19 United Arab Emirates I 0 
Luxembourg 0 o Uganda 0 o Uzbekistan 5 0 
Mali 0 oUkraine 23 16 Vietnam 0 0 
Malta 0 o Venezuela 2 oYugoslavia 0 0 
Mauritius 0 oYemen 0 oZimbabwe 3 0 
Mexico 4 10 Zambia 2 0 
Micronesia, Federated States of 0 0 
Monaco 0 0 
Mongolia I 0 
Myanmar (Boona) 0 0 
Namibia 0 0 
Nauru 0 0 
Netherlands 22 24 
New Zealand 5 0 
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Norway 6 10 
Palau 0 0 
Panama 0 0 
Peru 0 0 
Philippines 0 0 
Poland 10 16 
Portugal 3 0 
Puerto Rico 0 0 
Romania 19 18 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0 0 
Saint Lucia 0 0 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadine: 0 0 
Samoa 0 0 
San Marino 0 0 
Sao Tome and Principe 0 0 
Senegal 0 0 
Slovakia 6 0 
Slovenia 4 0 
South Africa 6 10 
Spain 19 13 
Suriname 0 0 
Sweden 7 II 
Switzerland 5 0 
Taiwan 5 0 
Thailand 8 0 
The Bahamas 2 0 
United Kingdom 29 28 
United States 103 87 
Uruguay 0 II 
Vanuatu 0 0 
Virgin Is lands 0 0 
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